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Abstract
RIGHI, ROBERT J. - The Shifting Dynamics of International Reserve Currencies
ADVISORS - Eshragh Motahar and Jue Wang

Throughout most of post World War II period, the United States dollar has
been globally accepted as the dominant reserve currency. This dominance comes
with “exorbitant privilege” or special benefits such as not having a balance of
payments problem. Therefore, with the shifting of global geopolitical balance of
power in the age of Trump, along with the recognition by the IMF of the Chinese
renminbi as an international reserve currency in 2015, it is important to
understand the modern influence of reserve currencies. We provide an updated
study of the status of the dollar, the euro, and in particular, the renminbi as it is an
upcoming reserve currency. To do so, we use currency exchange rate data and
apply modified workhorse regression models analyzing the co-movement of 149
countries’ currencies with each of the five major reserve currencies. We are then
able to assign each country’s gross domestic product at purchasing power parity
to a reserve currency bloc in order to obtain a global sphere of influence for each
reserve currency. We find that the United States retains its dominance but faces
challenges from the renminbi and the euro in recent years as the international
monetary system becomes tri-polar. We analyze particular current events in
specific countries and regions to help explain why we see this shifting dynamic.
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Chapter One
Introduction
A. Statement of Purpose

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relative decline of the
United States dollar (USD) as a reserve currency. In particular, we want to
quantify the use of renminbi (RMB) as an upcoming reserve currency and predict
its future impact. Our work seeks to provide an updated view of the international
monetary system and compare these results to what previous researchers have
found. This is extremely important, for many reasons to be discussed, but
particularly as the Chinese currency has gained more recognition in recent years,
there has been a very large increase in Chinese investments and trade, and there
have been shifting political climates globally.

B. Background

Leading up to the 1950’s the United States did not have the dominant
reserve currency as Great Brittan did. As seen in Figure 1 that changed drastically
as the dollar has been dominant ever since. However, in recent years we now see
a rise in other currencies to rival the dollar. This work will investigate the global
influence of the major reserve currencies including the RMB and analyze the
impacts that a paradigm shift will have on the global economy.

	
  

1	
  

Figure 1- Currency Composition of Globally Disclosed Foreign Exchange
Reserves in percent.
Source: Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl (2016)

Reserve currencies are held by countries’ central banks in order to be used
in international transactions. This includes investments and debt obligations. They
also are used to manage exchange rates. Reserve currencies have long been
studied to gain a better understanding of international finance and trade.
Throughout most of the modern day history of the international monetary system,
the United States has played a dominant role. There are large economic
implications for the United States having the dominant reserve currency. One
such implication is that there is a very high demand for the USD and countries
have a significant interest in seeing the dollar do well. The US has what is known
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as “Exorbitant Privilege,” that is it will not have a balance of payments problem
as all of its transactions are done in the USD. In addition, since the United States
controls the money supply it benefits from seigniorage or the value gained by
minting money. However, there are some negatives associated with being the
dominant reserve currency. This would include increased spending, and possibly
cheaper imports hurting domestic firms. However, being the major reserve
currency is in large part beneficial.
Therefore, it is extremely important to study the international monetary
system and to examine the shifts that occur over time. The international reserve
system as a whole can be criticized with an overreliance on the dollar, and the
United States unfairly taking advantage of the benefits of being the major reserve
currency. An example can be seen with the large amounts of spending the United
States had in the Vietnam War, which led to the end of the Bretton Woods system
in 1971. Conversely, the USD can provide stability, liquidity, and safe assets in
times of financial crises. It provides a reliable network and a common currency
that most countries use in international exchanges and transactions.
Despite these arguments, there has been a push for diversification. In fact,
recent years have seen that there has been diversification in the international
monetary system particularly with the rise of the euro leading to a bi-polar
system. We would like to examine China’s role in this increased diversification,
particularly in the years after 2015, when the RMB was officially recognized as a
reserve currency in a political climate characterized by a Chinese push for global
power and a United States shift toward nationalism in the age of Trump. As the
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reserve system shifts to a tri-polar system there are many economic implications
for the United States in terms of its exorbitant privilege.

C. Structure of Thesis

This thesis consists of five chapters with Chapter One and Chapter Five
being the introduction and the conclusion. Chapter Two will detail previous works
on reserve currencies. This will look at why the study of reserve currencies, and
subsequently this thesis is important. It will also detail previous methods of
studying reserve currencies and detailing how the methods we used were
developed. Chapter Three will discus the methods of analysis that were employed
in this thesis such as workhorse regression methods, forecasting, and identifying
currency blocs. Finally, Chapter Four will outline our results and their
significance.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review
A. Introduction

This chapter is dedicated to analyzing the relevant literature pertaining to
this work. More specifically, we will look at three major topics of discussion. The
first area of interest is the role international reserves from a historical perspective.
This allows us to frame the importance of our study in a historical context. Next,
we would like to describe China’s potential for, as well as the barriers to,
establishing a major global reserve currency. Finally, we will discuss various
methods that have previously been used to measure the size of reserve shares. In
addition, we will describe the most important work relating to this research, and
highlight the ideas and topics that will be built upon.

B. History of International Reserves

There have been many major events in the history of the international
monetary system that have overtime shaped it into what we see today and have
allowed for the diversification that this work seeks to study and understand. The
first major event that we would like to discuss is the formation of the Bretton
Woods system in 1944. The landmark conference in New Hampshire laid the
foundation for the modern day international monetary system. This system
maintained international exchange rates by backing currencies by gold. It also
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allowed the United States to establish a global reserve currency, particularly
because of the United States control of the global gold shares. This truly was an
impactful event that gives researchers a timeframe to start studying international
reserves.
The first major focus of Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl (2016) was to
expand the data back in time to create a reliable look at this timeframe post
Bretton Woods. As the paper discusses, when the Bretton Woods system began to
take place the United States dollar (USD) was not always the major reserve
currency. In fact, it was the British pound (GBP) that held this distinction. The
researchers attribute this to relations that Great Brittan had following World War
II. Many countries held ties to the British Empire and part of that allegiance
involved holding the GBP. Yet as this work shows, in the early 1950’s there was a
drastic shift to the USD as the major reserve currency that has continued until
today.
Importantly, this shows that not only are there changes in the reserve
currency market, but they can be extremely drastic. Therefore we can reason that
it is quite possible that an important event, like the recognition of the Chinese
renminbi (RMB) by the IMF as an international reserve currency, can trigger a
dramatic change in the global shares of reserves. On the other hand, Eichengreen,
Chitu, and Mehl’s research expanding data back in time shows that after this shift
the United States share has remained relatively constant particularly after the
establishment of the euro, which will be discussed in further detail later on.
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The second major focus of Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl is to analyze
how reserve currencies were impacted with the fall of the Bretton Woods system.
The end of the Bretton Woods system can be characterized as overspending by
the United States on the Vietnam War. This spending led to an inability to back
the dollar by gold, which eventually caused the United States to end the Bretton
Woods agreement in 1971. Many countries viewed, and still argue today that the
spending was an abuse of the United States’ exorbitant privilege. By any means it
created a significant change in the system of reserves.
Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl’s research looks at the main differences
prior to and after this time. What these researchers find is that post Bretton Woods
there is a decrease in the importance of network effects and an increase in
importance of policy credibility effects. That is, countries post Bretton Woods can
see financial gains by holding one particular currency over another due to the
floating exchange rates as opposed to the fixed rates seen earlier. In addition, with
the more diversity of currency in the market there is less importance on what
other countries choose to hold. Interestingly, the findings show that policy aimed
at discouraging use of another currency has a greater impact on which reserve
currencies are used than policies bolstering a particular one.
Since we see countries having a greater ability to diversify which reserve
currencies they hold, it opens the door for new currencies to take hold and gain a
significant global share. Meanwhile, the United States must be more active to
hold onto its share. Especially because, as Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl state,
there are stark benefits to diversification as countries now have the ability to
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monetize their reserves according to the “upheaval hypothesis.” The upheaval
hypothesis asserts that the reserve currency system has altered after the shift from
fixed to flexible exchange rates. This certainly plays a role as the RMB is
recognized as a reserve currency.
We begin to see even more diversification in the international monetary
system with the formation of the Euro starting in 1999. Papaioannou and Portes
(2008) evaluate the international status of the Euro in the first few years after its
formation. The work saw that the euro had taken a foothold in global reserve
shares, and predicted a gradual convergence of the shares of the USD and euro in
the future. It was found that an era defined by globalism and increase in global
trade was a determining factor in the Euro becoming a dominant reserve currency.
The euro has maintained a relatively constant share of global reserves
since their paper was written, but that does not discount the possibility that it will
gain more. It does emphasize the ability for a new currency to become a major
player as an international reserve. It would also be very interesting to compare
how the RMB does in its initial years as a reserve currency compared to the euro.
This is unfortunately a hard comparison to make, however, as there are some key
differences between the two. Namely, many European countries had already
established their currency as international reserves prior to the formation of the
euro. The euro in turn already had a place in the market to take. This would have
to be factored out in any comparison that is to be made between the RMB and the
euro.
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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recognized the RMB as a reserve
currency in 2015. We argue that this is a major event to help diversify the
international monetary system. Our goal is to study the effects this change had
internationally in the few years after it occurred. We will be able to do this by
studying the RMB and its influence globally.
Historically major events do tend to have big impacts on the
diversification of the international monetary system. This is true with both the
formation and demise of Bretton Woods, and the implementation of the euro.
Adding to the importance of this work, these events serve to bolster the idea that
because the RMB was recognized as a global reserve currency, it could serve a
major role internationally. We will subsequently further discuss the current
international conditions that add even more weight to this argument in the next
sections.

C. The Current State of China and Status of RMB

There have been many debates over the ability of China to be a major
player internationally. For example Zhou (2009) argues that because of China’s
growth, size, and growing trade networks it is destined to play a major role. Zhou
also looks at the Chinese position that there is an overreliance on the dollar and
that the RMB serves as a currency to help diversify the international reserve
system. On the other hand Prasad (2015) argues that China faces too many
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barriers, particularly with its political policies, and limitations that it has with the
capital account as well as exchange rate.
Dollar (2018) looks at the arguments for and against China. First, the
researcher recognizes that China is in a good position to have a major reserve
currency in the future referencing the formidable traits listed above. However,
Dollar argues that there are many impediments to its immediate and future rise.
The author states that the main barrier that China faces is the freedom of its
financial assets. The research finds that countries are less willing to take up a
reserve currency if its capital account is closed.
China has many current policies that restrict both the access that
foreigners have to Chinese assets as well as access that citizens have to financial
assets. Other countries prefer to have open access, as the capital account is a large
medium of exchange of foreign currencies. Therefore, Dollar argues that China
will not be able to establish itself until it makes changes in regards to the capital
account. Once China is able to make these changes then the other factors will kick
in to succeed on the international market.
Moreover, there are additional problems China faces in order to make
these accounts more open. More specifically, this is the case with its exchange
rates. China has in the past pegged its currency to the USD. That is the RMB will
follow along with the rates of the USD. In addition, China has been accused of
manipulating its currency and not allowing for it to be free floating, but instead
keeping it in a desired range. Revisiting the upheaval hypothesis this poses a
significant barrier to China’s international status. There would be very little
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reason to choose the RMB as the dollar would provide a safer alternative with the
same upside.
Subsequently as China opens its capital account it quite possibly can face
a currency appreciation crisis. Access to financial assets can create a large
demand for the RMB. Therefore, we could see the value of the RMB skyrocket.
This could in turn be detrimental to the Chinese economy being a manufacturing
exporter. China relies on its ability to produce cheap exports, which is in part why
it has been accused of devaluing currency. So changes must occur over a longer
period of time.
However, China has been the exception to the rules in many cases. As
Dollar discuses, the country has extremely high development and economic
growth for the institutions and rule of law relative to other countries. It is
therefore reasonable to think that China can be an exception to the rule for
international reserves as well. This is especially true because of its global
influence in trade, and the recent stances on promoting the RMB globally. China,
according to Dreher et al. (2017), spent about 80 billion USD in developing
countries for infrastructure. This was a part of its Belt and Road project to expand
trading networks and infrastructure.
Dollar argues that this project actually is an example of stalled progress of
the RMB in the international market. The reason is that China used mostly USD
to pay for the development. In fact, only 2.6 percent was denoted in RMB. We
argue the exact opposite: which is, despite most of the development being done in
USD this is a major step to becoming a major world currency. Primarily this is
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expanding China’s influence globally through trading blocs and importantly lays a
foundation for a high volume of future global payment to be done in RMB.
Summers (2015) states that the One Belt, One Road Project involves
connecting more than 60 countries that account for about a third of the entire
global GDP. This is a major project in which China stands to possibly gain a lot
from. Building a larger trade network expands the sphere of Chinese influence in
trade, and can expand the RMB’s global influence. With an increase in trade
volume we would expect an increase of use in the RMB in global transactions.
This process will take a long time and the effects will not be seen
immediately, as Ferdinand (2016) puts the project’s time frame at around thirty to
thirty-five years. Yet it does highlight China’s willingness to expand globally and
its desire for global influence. There are many factors that have presented
themselves in the three years following the IMFs recognition of China as an
official reserve currency. China’s expanding role internationally, coupled with
global attitudes along with European and American policy, has created an
interesting environment for the global role of the RMB that we argue is incredibly
important to study in order to gauge the international monetary system now as
well as to help understand the outlook of what we can expect in the future.
There is a plethora of United States policy that have direct implications for
the USD as a reserve currency as well as the RMB, which we argue are of a vital
importance as to why the 2015-2018 timeframe must be studied. The most
important is the election of Trump in 2016 that marks a shifting United States
view from a globalist foreign policy to a more nationalistic one. We believe there
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are three important policy points that have deterred or will deter countries from
using the USD as a reserve currency and instead use other alternatives such as the
euro or the RMB. The Trump administration’s stance on trade, the removal from
the Iran Deal, and sanctions on Russia all can lead to impactful changes that our
work looks to study.
Trump has vehemently expressed his views on United States trade and the
need for reform in international trade deals. One major policy that has major
economic implications is the implementation of tariffs placed on international
goods. For instance, according to Conca (2018) Trump has levied a 25% percent
tariff on steel and 10% on solar aluminum. As this article states, this opens the
door to a trade war as other countries place tariffs on United States products as
well.
This leads to a concept that Sheu and Kundu (2017) discuss known as
trade diversion. Trade diversion is the shifting of trade to a less efficient exporter
as the result of trade deals that reduce tariffs and barriers to trade. As the United
States leaves trade deals and imposes tariffs, we expect countries to shift away
from United States trade. With the reduction of trade the United States has with
China, China will in turn seek other trade partners to “unload” its goods. In
addition, China becomes a much more attractive country to trade with, as an
alternative to the United States, as it expands and makes significant investments
promoting international trade in the One Belt and One Road project. Again we
argue that this in turn bolsters the need, or desire to use alternatives to the USD in
international exchanges.
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This is due to the fact that there will be less volume of trade done with the
United States with these tariffs. In addition, there will be less direct exchanges
with the United States. So, countries may view it more practical, especially with
the Chinese views on globalization stated before, to use their own currency or
other countries’ currencies when doing deals with them that do not involve the
United States. It would simply be more efficient to establish networks to use the
RMB in these transactions. We believe that these recent events can have a major
impact on the global influence of the RMB as China continues to expand its
trading networks and infrastructure.
The next policy that we would like to assess is the United States
withdrawal from the Iran deal. There has certainly been both support and
opposition in United States politics. Barnes and Barron (2018) discuss the history
of the policy, as well as the implications for a United States withdrawal from the
deal. The work mentions that the United States European allies are not happy with
the United States policy actions in this manner and discuss the future outlook
there. Some allies are reluctantly supporting the United States, while others are
weighing their own options. Barnes and Barron mention that the future outlook
for United States and Iranian relations is certainly rocky, but this could certainly
get backlash from the Europeans.
The Iran policy is directly related to the relationship that the United States
has with Russia. Slav (2018) talks about sanctions the United States has on Russia
and Iran, and the impact that this will have on the dollar. Mostly the two “sanction
buddies” will look for ways to undermine the United States. The two countries
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have long discussed an oil-for-goods exchange program to divert the sanctions for
use of the USD in transactions with Iran. In addition, as Europeans are upset by
the United States withdrawal from the Iran deal, there has been talk of
establishing networks to doing a large amount of global transactions in the Euro
or Swiss franc, which would greatly hurt the USD dominance as a reserve
currency.	
  One such attempt, by the European Union, specifically by France,
Germany, and the UK, is the institution of INSTEX (Instrument in Support of
Trade Exchanges). This may not succeed, but is yet another indicator that
countries might be trying to escape from the adverse effects of the USD reserve
currency monopoly. Slav also discusses the influence of pricing oil in euros as
opposed to dollars. The Russians are making a strong push to circumvent the
dollar, and Russian oil companies are urging Western commodity traders to pay in
euro. This is yet other example of the importance of the 2015-2018 and the
shifting dynamic involving the de-dollarization of the international reserve
network.
China’s role as a developing global player can very much accelerated,
particularly due to the global political climate that we witness today. As we have
mentioned, it has many positive attributes that would make it a viable option for
an increased role in the international monetary system. Despite also facing many
barriers to entry, it has been known to be an “exception to the rule” in many
instances. In addition, in recent years China has made major pushes towards
globalization, making significant investments in infrastructure and trade networks.
Coinciding with the IMF’s recognition of the Chinese Yuan as a reserve currency

	
  

15	
  

is an extremely unique political environment globally characterized by President
Trump and pushes towards nationalism. We believe that all of this combined
solidifies the years post 2015 as extremely important to study in order to get a full
understanding of the past, current, and future of the international monetary
system.

D. Previous Methods

Much of the work that has previously been discussed studies the shares
and explicit use of various currencies globally to gauge each currency’s role and
influence. For example Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl (2016), as discussed earlier,
analyze network and policy effects by looking at the size of the shares of reported
reserves. Although the work does a great job of expanding the data set back in
time, there is still little data for the RMB. That is inherently due to the fact of how
recent IMF reporting of the RMB is. Furthermore, Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl
show that there are a lot of holes in IMF reporting that despite a relatively good
job of plugging, it still creates problems when combining data sets from various
sources over a long time frame would have.
This then begs the essential question of this research. How do we
accurately measure the RMB’s influence as a reserve currency in an international
monetary system that has recently shown signs of diversifying? To answer this we
turn to work done by Tovar and Nor (2018) introducing an alternative approach to
measuring the influence of reserve currencies than the typical one found in other
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literature. More specifically, calculating the influence that each major currency
bloc has on other currencies. This work from 1969-2015 will serve as the
foundation for our research as we focus on the more recent time period for the
reasons discussed in the previous sections.
Tovar and Nor study currency co-movements of national currencies with
reserve currencies to determine what reserve currency bloc each national currency
is a part of. It is then possible to calculate the global share of GDP that each
reserve currency influences. The results indicate that the USD is dominant with a
global share of GDP of about 40 percent. Interestingly, this is followed by the
RMB with about a 30 percent share of global GDP. Finally the Euro holds around
20 percent. This indicates that the sphere of influence of the RMB is larger than
otherwise thought in work analyzing reserve currency shares. In addition, the
RMB going into 2015 already has an established influence globally.
In order to calculate each sphere of influence Tovar and Nor built on
Frankel and Weis’s (1994) methodology for analysis using workhorse regressions.
This methodology is argued to have some drawbacks particularly with the fact
that the RMB has been pegged to the USD in the past, which presents a
collinearity problem. So to address these concerns the researchers employ Kawai
and Pontines’ (2016) approach to analyzing the sphere of influence of the RMB.
There is a major difference between the work of Kawai and Pountines and
Tovar and Nor. That is Kawai and Pountines looked at the sphere of influence of
the RMB in Asia whereas Tovar and Nor were able to expand this approach to the
global scale. Kawai and Pountines believed that if a large effect were to be
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measured for the RMB it would be more localized in the Chinese region. Tovar
and Nor were able to verify that this effect was in fact extended globally.
To measure the global effect the researchers calculated a relative and
absolute sphere of influence for each of the major reserve currency to gather an in
depth look at the historical and recent state of the international monetary system.
This is groundbreaking work that we look to expand upon by incorporating the
most recent three-year period. We will also look to duplicate their results and
corroborate their findings.
The work found that the transition from a bi-polar reserve system to a tripolar system is well underway. However, the USD still, as is the case historically,
plays the dominant role. A lot of the RMB’s influence is attributed to BRICs
currencies. BRIC refers to Brazil, Russia, India and China. These countries are
grouped because they are at a similar stage of economic development.
Interestingly, the influence of the RMB is more on BRICS currencies as opposed
to playing a central role in Asia. Part of our work will be devoted to seeing if in
the last few years this makeup of the RMB’s influence has changed. That is we
will look to see if the RMB dominance is extended beyond the BRICS currencies.
With that said, the RMB dominance in these countries is extremely important. We
expect that as these countries continue to grow, so will the role of the RMB
internationally.
The researchers also looked at the reserve currency blocs and how they
changed over time. First there was a decrease in the use of the dollar following the
end of the Bretton Woods agreement. Furthermore, there were decreases in each
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region during the respective financial crises that were faced (ERM crisis
decreased the European share whereas 2007 decreased the dollars). Finally, there
was a large increase in the European shares following the introduction to the
Euro. These findings add light to the fact that major economic events, particularly
those pertaining to the international monetary system, do greatly impact the
influence of reserve currencies. Thus far, we have seen ample evidence to suggest
that there would be a shifting dynamic of the RMB following the recognition as a
reserve currency by the IMF in the age of Trump.
In addition to studying the influence of each major reserve currency the
work also analyzed what factors play an important role in determining a
currencies influence. What was found was that networking effects play a big role
still, somewhat contrasting the work on the upheaval hypothesis. In addition the
size of a country matters, and as we stated before China has seen unprecedented
growth in recent history. Finally debt levels hurt the size of blocs and current
account surpluses undermine them.
These works lay the groundwork for how our research will be conducted.
Another interesting avenue that could be explored in the future is the role of the
demand for oil in determining the influence of a reserve currency. As we
discussed earlier there is the prospect of Russia pricing oil in Euros. It is therefore
possible to remove the influence of oil to get a true “influence” of each reserve
currency. This would also give an idea of the importance of oil and how shifting
global dynamics will impact the influence of each respective reserve currency.

	
  

19	
  

E. Conclusions

The formation of the Bretton-Woods system in 1944 laid the groundwork
for the international monetary system that we have today. However, many major
events including its demise in 1971 have led to many changes along the way.
Particularly over time there has been a shifting dynamic allowing for the
diversification of reserve currencies, and many major global players rising to be
formidable candidates for reserve currencies. We have already seen this to be the
case with the euro.
We expect this to be the case with the RMB as well. As many researchers
have already seen, the Chinese currency already plays a role internationally. We
believe that with a combination of the current global political climate, China’s
rise in terms of GDP and FDI as well as significant investment in trade in the One
Belt, One Road project, and the IMFs formal recognition of the Chinese currency
as an official reserve currency all bolster the RMBs influence in global markets.
We will be able to test this theory by imploring previous methods into comovement of currencies with the major reserve currencies. This will in turn allow
us to see what change, if any, the Chinese Yuan experienced post 2015.

	
  

20	
  

Chapter Three
Methods

A. Introduction
In this chapter we will provide a detailed description of our research
methodology. This includes the data and the models that we use, as well as other
tools that we applied in our analysis. Our work employs modified workhorse
regressions as well as other techniques to analyze the role of major reserve
currencies on the global scale. We seek to show an updated view of the influence
of reserve currencies globally. This is especially important in the age of Trump
and with the formal recognition of the RMB as an international reserve currency.
In this section we will explain our choice of the model as well as defend the
various methods that we use. This chapter will be split into three different
sections. The first will detail our data discussing what data was used, where the
data came from, and the process of cleaning the data. The second section will
outline our empirical model and the reasons for choosing this method as opposed
to other alternatives. Finally, the third section will discuss additional steps we
took in our analysis. This includes addressing and ruling out potential problems
that we face.
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B. Data

Our work uses exchange rate data as reported by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF has near global membership, as it is comprised
of 189 countries. The IMF’s main goal is to ensure the stability of the
international monetary system. They also provide reliable, up to date economic
data. For exchange rate data we use end of period monthly data reported by the
IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Our model uses exchange rates per USD
for reasons explained in the next section. To visualize the data that will be used
for this research, log scale exchange rates in terms of USD can be seen in Figure
2.

Figure 2- Log scale end of period monthly exchange rates per USD for 2006M12018M11.
Source: IMF
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We chose our time frame from 2006M1-2018M11 for multiple reasons.
First, we see very low correlation between the United States dollar and the
renminbi. We found the correlation to be .546, which is extremely encouraging
for the use of this time period in our results. This is especially true considering
that there were time periods where the RMB was directly pegged to the USD with
a perfect correlation of 1.This also implies this is actually a period of relatively
free floating for the renminbi backing up historical accounts. As we will discuss
later, this greatly helps to deal with the multicolinearity of our model. The second
reason we used this time period is that our work looks to paint an up to date
picture of the global influence of major currencies. Since China’s currency started
to become a large global player during this time, it is imperative that it is the
focus of our study. Finally, this allows for a large sample of countries with
complete data. We use a representative sample of 149 countries to estimate the
global influence of the reserve currencies. Countries whose data was incomplete
were removed from our sample. In addition, we argue our 155 data points are
sufficient to create a respectable sample size for the model.
Our data for gross domestic product at purchasing-power parity (GDPPPP) is obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database. We use the
individual share of GDP-PPP an individual country has in a given year. This is
annual data reported at the end of each period. Our work uses the global shares of
GDP-PPP for 2018. This is to ensure that our results are reflexive of the time
period that we are using, as well as to provide a clear scope of the current outlook.
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C. Model

This work utilizes models employed by Tovar and Nor (2018). These
models are difference in log workhorse regression models that were initially used
by Frankel and Wei (1994). They are designed to analyze co-movement of
international currencies with the major reserve currencies. However, there were
some drawbacks to Frankel and Wei’s equation. Namely, the biggest problem was
the fact that the effects of the RMB were not measured. This at the time was
understandable, but as the RMB came into fruition and a major reserve currency,
it needed to be included. Therefore Tovar and Nor use a modified approach used
by Kawai and Pontines (2016). This model measured the effect of the RMB.
Kawai and Pontines’ model only focused on a localized region in Asia in their
analysis. Therefore, Tovar and Nor extended this model on the global scale. They
were the first researchers to do a global scale of this kind of analysis. We will
employ the same equation that Tovar and Nor used in their work. Our work will
then show an updated picture of the various reserve currencies on the global scale
in the age of Trump and post official recognition of the RMB as a reserve
currency by the IMF. The model is expressed in the following form:
Δlog(x/USD)t= β0 + β1Δlog(EUR/USD)t + β2Δlog(GBP/USD)t +
β3Δlog(JPY/USD)t + β4Δlog(RMB/USD)t + εt

(1)

where x is an individual country and USD serves as our choice for the numeraire
currency. Our dependent variable is the logarithmic change in of a country’s

	
  

24	
  

currency in terms of the USD. The regression coefficients represent the weight
each major reserve currency has on currency x. Since we use difference in log we
can calculate the “inferred” United States effect. This is done by the constraint β5
= 1 - β1 - β2 - β3 - β4.
Tovar and Nor (2018) use equation (1) throughout their work but express
collinearity problems with the RMB as it was pegged to the USD for a long
period of time. They address these problems by employing a second two-stage
model. In this work we use an alternative method to address these problems. That
is, we use a sample period in which the RMB was not pegged to the USD. As
stated before our period will range from 2006-2018. By choosing the USD as our
numeraire currency, as well as leaving it out of our initial model and calculating
the effect afterwards, we are able to alleviate the collinearity problem.
Our methods use a comprehensive list of 149 countries to create a
balanced sample to estimate effects. We will repeat equation (1) 149 times
running the regression once for each country in our sample. In each case we will
note the highest coefficient in the model. Country x will then be placed into the
reserve currency bloc for whichever has the highest coefficient. So by calculating
the weight of each reserve currency on each individual country we can calculate
the sphere of influence each reserve currency has. We obtain the size of reserve
currency blocs by assigning a country’s GDP-PPP reported by the IMF global
outlook data to the country whose reserve currency has the greatest influence on
that country’s currency, as found from the coefficients in (1).
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Our methods serve as an alternative to traditional studies about reserve
currencies. Typical studies look mostly as shares of reserve currencies and factors
that affect reserve currencies. Our methods are beneficial in that we can measure
the direct effect the reserve currencies themselves have internationally. They are
also useful in that they not only paint a picture on the global scale with currency
blocs, but we can also point to individual countries and how each currency is
directly impacted. This allows us to put countries and regions into historical
context as well as utilize traditional findings to support or explain our results. In
addition, our methods allow for measuring the effect of the RMB both prior to
and post being officially recognized as a reserve currency by the IMF in 2015.

D. Additional Methods

This section is devoted to addressing concerns with our model as well as
discussing additional steps that were taken. The first problem that we incurred
was with autocorrelation. This is measured by the Durbin-Watson statistic.
Durbin-Watson always has a value between 0 and 4 with a value of 2 meaning
there was no autocorrelation detected in the sample. If the value is less than 2 it
implies there is positive autocorrelation detected in the sample while greater than
two is negative autocorrelation. This is a very useful tool to have considering our
data is time series.
We ran a significance test on our Durbin-Watson statistic for each of the
149 models at the 1 percent level. We had 155 observations in each regression as
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well as 4 right hand side variables. Our lower bound was 1.57 and our upper
bound was 1.679. First if the statistic is greater than 2 we subtract it from 4. Then,
if the statistic is greater than the upper bound and less than 2 then we fail to reject
the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation. We found this to be the case in
most of our models. However, if the Durbin-Watson statistic is lower than the
lower bound then we reject the null hypothesis and there is autocorrelation
present. This was the case in almost one third of our models. There is a third case
for this significance test. That is, the test is inconclusive if the Durbin-Watson
statistic is in between the lower and upper bounds. To err on the side of caution
we took a conservative approach in which we failed to reject the null if the
statistic was between the two bounds.
Our next step in this process of dealing with autocorrelation was to run
autoregressive models for each case autocorrelation was found. The first step in
the process is running (1) at time t, however we believe the error in this case is not
random as seen in the first order autoregressive error structure, which is expressed
in the following form:

εt = ρεt-1 + et
(2)

In (2) et is random error. To extract this random error we then run (1) at time t-1
and multiply through by ρ. Subsequently we subtract this from (1) at time t. This
yields:
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Δlog(x/USD)t= ρΔlog(x/USD)t-1 + β0 - ρβ0 + β1Δlog(EUR/USD)t ρβ1Δlog(EUR/USD)t-1 + β2Δlog(GBP/USD)t - ρ β2Δlog(GBP/USD)t-1 +
β3Δlog(JPY/USD)t - ρβ3Δlog(GBP/USD)t-1 + β4Δlog(RMB/USD)t ρβ4Δlog(GBP/USD)t-1 + εt - ρεt-1
(3)

Note that if we solve for et in (2) the result is precisely the error term in (3)
allowing for random error in our model. A major problem with autoregressive
models is the impact they have on coefficients. However, this is not the case with
the results of our models. In every case the coefficients only changed very
slightly, and the largest coefficient never changed in our autoregressive model. In
addition the significance of the coefficients never changed. This allows us to rule
out autocorrelation as a major problem in our models. This is expected as using
difference in logs already minimizes the effect of autocorrelation.
We also wanted to delve into the predictive power of or regressions. One
way to do so is to calculate the R-squared predicted values. R-squared predicted is
a measure for how well the model makes predictions. It is also useful in that it is a
good indicator on if the model overfits the data. The statistic is calculated by
removing a data point, running the regression, predicting the removed data point,
and then comparing that predicted point to the actual observed value. This process
is then repeated for all of the data points.
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Another useful tool for analyzing the predictive power of our models is
forecasting. This is done in a similar fashion as the predicted R-squared.
However, instead of predicting every point separately we can reduce our sample
size to 2006-2015 and predict from then on. For individual countries this is an
extremely useful tool. Particularly if we believe that there is a stark difference due
to the recognition of the RMB as a reserve currency we would see poor
predictions with high error. We can apply this method to a select group of key
counties such as the Russian Federation and Brazil.

E. Conclusions

We believe that our methods achieve the goals that we have set. They
provide an accurate up to date look at the current state of major reserve currencies
through reliable and updated data. In addition our time period of interest has low
multicolinearity. Multicolinearty poses many problems for time periods where the
RMB is pegged to the USD. We were able to account for autocorrelation. Using
difference in logs mostly accounts for autocorrelation on its own, but we were
able to further address this problem through the use of autoregressive models.
Finally we were able explore the predictive power of our models. With the
implementation of these methods and techniques we believe we can provide
reliable and accurate results.
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Chapter Four
Results
A. Introduction

In this section we will outline the results of our analysis. Our results will
be detailed in two ways. First, we will look at countries at the individual level.
More specifically, we will look at important cases for particular countries, and
then discuss the reasons for certain currency reserve influences. This includes
Russia, which in recent years has attempted to circumvent United States’
sanctions. In addition we look at regions such as Central America, Africa, and the
Middle East and discuss general trends we observe with countries in the region.
We will also point out some anomalies in our results such as Israel, Brazil, and
Mexico, which we previously expected to be more in line with the USD. We will
then be able to comment on the importance of our results on the global scale. This
entails establishing and analyzing currency reserve blocs and discussing the
current state of the international monetary system. We calculate both absolute and
relative currency blocs and discuss the viability of their use. We will then
comment on future implications that our results have.

B. Regression Results

Table 1 displays the correlation matrix for the currencies in terms of the
USD. There is very little to no correlation between these currencies. The

	
  

30	
  

correlation between the pound and the euro is .718 but we do not see this as a
cause for concern. They pound also has minor global influence relative to the
other three reserve currencies, as we will discuss later on.

Currency EURO
RMB
YEN
POUND
EURO
1 -0.118719323
0.47868885 0.718113447
RMB
-0.11871932
1
0.370757467 -0.427632543
YEN
0.47868885 0.370757467
1 -0.013579476
POUND
0.718113447 -0.427632543
-0.01357947
1
Table 1 - Correlation matrix of exchange rates in terms of USD from 2006-2018.
Source: IMF

We start by looking at Russia. This country is of particular interest to our
work for multiple reasons. The sheer size of Russia makes it important on the
global scale, especially for the outlook of the international monetary system.
However, it is primarily interesting in its current state because of the sanctions
that the United States have imposed on Russia and Russia’s desire to circumvent
these sanctions by using other currencies in international transactions. Therefore it
comes as no surprise that the weight the USD has on the Russian ruble is not
significantly different from zero. However, what is interesting is that the Chinese
RMB accounts for the largest portion of movement in the ruble. We also see a
very large effect for the euro. Both the euro and the RMB are statistically
significant at the 5% level in the autoregressive error model.
It is clear from our results that Russia has taken steps to circumvent the
dollar. Russia is aligning itself almost evenly with China and Europe. Importantly,
it is an example of a large portion of the international monetary system where the
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USD is not a major factor. This is, at least in some sense, an indication that the
United States can lose its global dominance if countries are unhappy with the
United States. It certainly shows that the USD in the current make up of the
international monetary system is sharing the world stage with other major
currencies.
The predicted R Squared for this model is .168. This is in general not
good. However, it is close to the R Squared Adjusted for our model of .23. This
tells us we are not over fitting the data. Additionally we restricted the sample size
from 2006-2015. We then used this model to forecast 2015-2018. This can be
seen in Figure 3. The predicted values are plotted in orange and the actual values
are plotted in blue. Overall our model did a poor job predicting in this case. The
mean absolute percent error was 55 and the root mean squared error was 36.88.
We attribute this to fundamental changes in Russia’s use of international
currencies, particularly pertaining to the sanctions placed by the United States. In
this case this is represented by a shift in the intercept, which can be seen in Figure
3.
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Figure 3- Predicted exchange rate values from 2015-2018 for the ruble plotted in
orange. The actual values are plotted in blue. The x-axis is month with 2006M1=1
and 2018M11=155.
Another major country of interest is Brazil. We found that the euro has the
largest effect on the Brazilian real. Our models show that the euro accounts for
about 58% of movement in the real. This is statistically significant at the 5%
level. We also saw that the RMB accounts for about 26% of movement in the real,
however this was not significant. This result is somewhat surprising. Particularly,
with the proximity to the United States, and with the United States being a large
trading partner of Brazil, we would expect that the USD would affect the real
more than its reserve currency counterparts, as is the case with most Central
American countries and in other South American countries like Uruguay. Yet we
only see a weight of 3%. Brazil is also not the only example of a South American
country with similar results but it is certainly the largest. However, these results
can be explained.
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According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) 42 percent
of Brazilian exports are to Asia with 20 percent going to Europe and 17 going to
North America. Similarly Brazils imports predominantly come from Asia and
Europe at 36 and 27 percent respectively. Brazil has a strong iron-ore trading
network with Europe and Asia. Therefore, it is reasonable to understand why
these are the currencies that have such a large effect on the real, as well as in other
South American countries with the mineral trade. There has also been a
substantial amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) from China into Brazil in
recent years. As Chinese firms shift their focus to the service sector there has been
a substantial increase in FDI in Latin America and in particular Brazil. According
to the OECD flows of FDI from China into Latin America have reached over 110
billion dollars with 60 billion going to Brazil (Avendano, MelGuizo, and Miner
2017).
We also found many African countries whose currency is greatly impacted
by the euro. The euro accounts for about 95% of movement in the CFA franc.
This is again statistically significant at the 5% level. The pound is also shown to
have a weight of 1% statistically significant at the 5% level. As was the case with
Brazil, Europe imports a lot of natural resources from Africa. Cote D'Ivoire for
example sends 11 percent of its exports to Germany according to the OEC. About
10 percent go to the Netherlands with 6.5 percent going to France. This is
substantially more than the 10 percent to the United States.
Economic ties between Europe and Africa go well beyond just trade.
Africa first started facing European aggression in the 1870’s. In 1884 the Berlin
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Conference was held to divide Africa amongst the European countries (Davies
2010). European colonization in Africa has greatly affected political and
economic ties ever since. Since there is such a large European presence in Africa,
it comes as no surprise that the euro has such a large effect on African currencies.
We similarly see that the USD has a lot of influence in the Middle East.
The United States is actively involved in this region and has been for a long time.
This is true both militarily and economically with regards to oil. The United
States also has historically had a large FDI in the region. Many of the countries in
this region are greatly impacted by the United States and the United States dollar.
For example, the United Arab Emirates dirham is directly pegged to the USD. We
also see in the autoregressive error model for Yemen, the USD accounts for 99%
of the movement of the Yemeni rial. Throughout this time period the rial had
mostly been pegged to the USD as well. In addition, the USD has the largest
weight on the Afghan afghani. We found that the USD accounts for 63% of
movement in the afghani. We did find that the RMB accounts for 29% of
movement. This was statistically significant at the 5% level. So there are other
influencers in the Middle East, but predominantly this region is a United States
stronghold in terms of currency movement.
One surprise to be noted was Israel. Israel is a key political ally of the
United States in the Middle East. It is reasonable to suspect that the USD would
have the largest influence on the Israeli new shekel. However, this is not the case.
The USD does account for around 11% of movements in the new shekel, which is
a considerable amount, but it is not the largest weight. That belongs to the RMB
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at around 38%. This was significant at the 10% level. The euro is significant at
the 5% level and has a weight of around 32%. Also, the pound was significant at
the 5% level and accounts for around 16% of movement in the new shekel. We
also found that the yen has a 2% weight but this was not statistically significant.
Israel is so aligned with the United States; it begs the question why is its
currency so greatly influenced by the RMB? Abrams (2018) describes China and
Israel as both being very pragmatic countries. They expand partnership, test new
markets, and seek new trade opportunities. Recently Israel has been developing
new bilateral trade relationships. In particular, they have greatly expanded
economic relationships with China. Abrams states that this is because China is
significantly interested in Israel’s technology sector, while Israel welcomes
Chinese investments. We argue that the results of our regressions and the RMB
influence on the new shekel are reflexive of the recently and quickly expanding
economic ties that have been observed between China and Israel.
The R Squared Adjusted for our model of Israel is .32 and our R Squared
Predicted is .3. Again these both in general are not high but they are similar which
tells us our model is not over fitting. When we restrict our sample and forecast
2015-2018, the model does a decent job of predicting. The root mean squared
error is .3 and the mean absolute percent error is 7.1. Like Russia we see a small
downward shit of the intercept in this case. This can be seen in Figure 4.
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Figure 4- Predicted exchange rate values for the new shekel plotted in orange. The
actual values are plotted in blue. These values are predicted from 2015-2018. The
x-axis is month with 2006M1=1 and 2018M11=155.
Mexico is a similar case to Israel. Despite sharing boarders with the
United States, the USD is not the biggest influencer of the Mexican peso. We
found the RMB to have the largest weight but this was not statistically significant.
We found the euro to account for 34% of the movements of the peso and this was
statistically significant at the 5% level. Mexico is similar to the case of Israel in
that is a pragmatic country. However, there is a large difference here. In recent
years Mexico has aligned itself more with China, especially in terms of trade.
This is occurring because of a more hostile relationship that Mexico has with the
United States, particularly with the period of renegotiation of the North American
Free Trade Agreement.
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C. Global Impacts

Based on our regression results for each country individually we assigned
global shares of GDP-PPP to each reserve currency. These are known as currency
blocs. We constructed our reserve currency blocs in two ways. The first were
absolute currency blocs. This involved assigning each country to a reserve
currency solely based on which reserve currency accounted for the most
movement in that particular country’s currency. The next were relative currency
blocs. In this case each country’s global share of GDP-PPP was split between
each of the major reserve currencies based on the coefficients in each individual
regression.
First we will discuss the absolute currency blocs. The results can be seen
in Table 2. About 5% of the global share of GDP-PPP was unaccounted for. This
is for two reasons. The first is that not every country had GDP-PPP data. The
second is that not every country had complete data on exchange rates from 20062018. However we feel that this is a very good representation of the current state
of the international monetary fund. We find, like Tovar and Nor (2018), that the
international monetary system is now tri-polar. China has a strong foothold in the
global economy. Surprisingly we find that in this time period the United States
has a share of 31.21 which is less than the 40.7 Tovar and Nor found from 20112015. Interestingly we do not see an increased share for China. They found the
Chinese share to be 32.5 where we find it to be 30.07. It is Europe that sees the
increased share from 19.5 to 27.43. That leads us to believe that as the dollar loses
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grip in the international monetary system, it will be the euro that makes up this
ground.

US

Europe

China Japan

UK

31.2

27.4

30.1

4.2

2.2

Tovar and Nor (2018) 40.1

19.5

32.5

4.8

2.5

Absolute Share

Table 2- Absolute currency bloc of global shares of GDP-PPP in percent (Approx.
5% of global GDP-PP is unaccounted for in our work)
We then turn to the relative currency blocs. The results can be seen in
Table 3. We see similar results as the absolute bloc in that there is a tri-polar
system. However, we see in this case that the US bloc is not the dominant one and
that in fact the Chinese bloc is. This is very surprising. However, we do not see
these results as reliable as the absolute blocs. This is mostly because they are
much more vulnerable to error in our estimations. For example in the relative bloc
we find Japan to have 3.22% of global GDP-PPP, however this is less than its
own GDP. This is because we are relying on the culmination of many
insignificant coefficients in which many appear as negative. This is opposed to
basing the blocs on strongly significant coefficients like we do for the absolute
bloc.
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Relative Share

US

Europe

China Japan

UK

25.2

28.2

31.8

3.2

6.8

20.3

31.6

5.3

4

Tovar and Nor (2018) 39

Table 3- Relative currency bloc of global shares of GDP-PPP in percent (Approx.
5% of global GDP-PP is unaccounted for)
Our results have major impacts on the global scale. Figure 5 shows a map
graph for each absolute currency bloc. Clearly neighboring countries are more
prone to being included in a major bloc, with some exceptions. This includes
Mexico and Canada which Tovar and Nor (2018) find to be in the US bloc. This
is another example of the decline of the Unites States global economic influence
in the past few years. It is clear that there are three major reserve currency blocs
and that the international monetary system in its current state is tri-polar.

Figure 5- Map graph of absolute major reserve blocs. Red represents the US,
yellow China, orange Europe, dark green UK, light green Japan, and white
countries do not have complete data.
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We also have to consider the argument that we need to remove the
country’s own GDP-PPP from the bloc. By subtracting this out from the absolute
shares we see that the United States and Europe become virtually even at 16% of
global GDP-PPP. China goes to 11% and both the UK and Japan go to 0%. This
does not change the overall scope of our results. It does however, bode in favor of
Europe, which throughout this analysis has shown strong upticks in comparison to
the work of Tovar and Nor.

D. Conclusions

Our results show a tri-polar international monetary system. This is directly
in line with the results found by Tovar and Nor (2018). However, we see an
increase in the influence of the Euro over our time frame from 2006-2018 in
addition to a decrease in the dominance of the dollar. We see geographical
changes such as Canada and Mexico changing from the US bloc to the Euro bloc
and Chinese bloc respectively. We additionally found that the Chinese renminbi
has a bloc of around 30% of the global share of GDP-PPP. Surprisingly with the
recognition of the Chinese RMB as a reserve currency in 2015 there does not
seem to be a rise in its sphere of influence. It is the Euro whose influence seems to
grow as the dollar’s influence falls. We find that in absolute terms the United
States still dominates the international monetary system, but in relative terms its
influence has declined.
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Chapter Five
Conclusions
A. Future Work

There is a lot of room for future work in this area. Most importantly, as
more exchange rate data becomes available these results can be updated to reflect
the time period. As this work has shown many factors including political events
and policy decisions can change the landscape of the international monetary
system and it is important to understand these changes. More work can be done
for the prediction of the future outlook of currency blocs. Autoregressive
integrated moving average (ARIMA) models can be used to predict exchange
rates for major reserve currencies, which can then be used to predict the major
influencers in the near future. Finally, more work can be done to integrate
traditional methods of studying reserve currencies with the methods used in this
research. This would allow for a more complex analysis and a greater
understanding of reserves and the international monetary system.

B. Summary of Work and Closing Statements

Using workhorse regression methods on exchange rate data from 20062018 we were able to provide an updated look at the international monetary
system in a time where the international geopolitical climate is changing and
China has gained more recognition. We find that the United States dollar is still
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the dominant reserve currency with its global share of GDP-PPP at 31.21 percent.
However, we show that it has experienced a decline in recent years for many
reasons such as increased Chinese investment and the circumvention of USimposed sanctions by countries like Iran and Russia. Importantly, we showed that
there were major changes that occurred at the country level compared to previous
periods. This included changes in the major currency influencer of Canada and
Mexico. Finally, our work shows that we are presently in a major time period of
potential transition in terms of the international monetary system.
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Variable	
  	
  
X/USD	
  

EUR/USD	
  
RMB/USD	
  
GBP/USD	
  

JPY/USD	
  
Gross	
  
Domestic	
  
Product	
  at	
  
Purchasing	
  
Power	
  Parity	
  

Appendix	
  	
  
Variable	
  Descriptions	
  
	
  
Name	
  in	
  Data	
  Set	
   Description	
  
ANY	
  COUNTRY	
  
International	
  Monetary	
  Fund	
  end	
  of	
  
NAME	
  
period	
  monthly	
  exchange	
  rates	
  per	
  
USD	
  of	
  currency	
  of	
  country	
  X	
  from	
  
2006M1-‐2018M11.	
  	
  
euroarea	
  
International	
  Monetary	
  Fund	
  end	
  of	
  
period	
  monthly	
  euro	
  exchange	
  rates	
  
per	
  USD	
  from	
  2006M1-‐2018M11.	
  	
  
chinaprmainland	
   International	
  Monetary	
  Fund	
  end	
  of	
  
period	
  monthly	
  renminbi	
  exchange	
  
rates	
  per	
  USD	
  from	
  2006M1-‐2018M11.	
  	
  
unitedkingdom	
   International	
  Monetary	
  Fund	
  end	
  of	
  
period	
  monthly	
  pound	
  sterling	
  
exchange	
  rates	
  per	
  USD	
  from	
  2006M1-‐
2018M11.	
  	
  
japan	
  
International	
  Monetary	
  Fund	
  end	
  of	
  
period	
  monthly	
  yen	
  exchange	
  rates	
  per	
  
USD	
  from	
  2006M1-‐2018M11.	
  	
  
GDP-‐PPP	
  
Country	
  2018	
  global	
  share	
  of	
  Gross	
  
Domestic	
  Product	
  at	
  Purchasing	
  Power	
  
Parity	
  provided	
  by	
  the	
  International	
  
Monetary	
  Fund.	
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